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Abstract
This paper reveals the ways in which media autocracy operates on political, judicial, 
economic and discursive levels in post-2007 Turkish media. Newsmakers in Turkey currently 
experience five different systemic kinds of neoliberal government pressures to keep their 
voice down: conglomerate pressure, judicial suppression, online banishment, surveillance 
defamation and accreditation discrimination. The progression of restrictions on media 
freedom has increased in volume annually since 2007; this includes pressure on the Doğan 
Media Group, the YouTube ban, arrests of journalists in the Ergenekon trials, phone tapping/
taping of political figures and the exclusion of all unfriendly reporters from political circles. 
The levels and tools of this autocracy eventually lead to certain conclusions about the 
qualities of this media environment: it is a historically conservative, redistributive, panoptic 
and discriminatory media autocracy.
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Introduction
Turkish media is under siege today by the ruling government of the AKP 
(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi/Justice and Development Party). The level of 
political pressure and legal restraints on news-reporting are visible in an 
unprecedented scale. Politics and the state have long influenced journalis-
tic practices in Turkey and the mandate of media bosses, political and/or 
economic pressures have very often worked against the independence of 
journalists. However, the mainstream media in Turkey now operate under a 
new political economy of censorship in which big business and media 
conglomerates can only challenge the government and its repressive tactics 
toward the news media when their economic interests are threatened. 
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At other times these media are silent and complacent. In contrast with the 
AKP’s call for ‘more democracy’ in 2002 when it first came to power, the 
situation has become even worse, particularly after the AKP’s second elec-
tion victory in 2007. In this article we identify the key mechanisms used by 
the AKP government to suppress media critical of its policies. We argue 
that conglomerate pressure, judicial suppression, online banishment, sur-
veillance defamation and finally accreditation discrimination are strategi-
cally used by the ruling government to suppress journalists in Turkey. We 
elaborate on these mechanisms further by looking into key developments 
in recent years.
There is a large body of literature on the right-wing takeover from inde-
pendent publishers to conglomerates in the 1980s (see Bagdikian 2004; 
Skinner, Compton and Gasher 2005; McChesney 2008) and the field of 
political economy of the media is very much influenced by the debates by 
Chomsky and McChesney, who have introduced a variety of conceptual 
tools to the field (such as filtering, flac) (Hermann and Chomsky 2002; 
McChesney 2008). Throughout the 1990s during the conglomeration of 
newspapers and news channels a similar effect was also felt in Turkish 
media but on a different scale (see Kaya 1999; Adaklı 2001; Adaklı 2006; 
Kaya and Çakmur 2010). However, the current authoritarian transformation 
points toward a different direction in the formation of media in Turkey as 
there is an unprecedented increase in the use of executive and judiciary 
power against media criticism.
During long periods of modern Turkish history media freedoms were 
repressed by various right wing governments holding a parliamentary 
majority (Heper and Demirel 1996). Adapting the model proposed by Hafez 
(2005) to identify three types of phases in the democratization of press in 
developing countries, we can set an initial historical framework to identify 
the changing methods of media censorship in Turkey by consecutive gov-
ernments. In the ‘authoritarian phase’ the political process is ‘monopolized 
by an elite that rules not on the basis of democratic procedures and legiti-
macy but by coercion and force’ (Hafez 2005: 146). This was the case in the 
Ottoman empire and in the early days of the Turkish republic when govern-
ments controlled the media through prior restraint (see Koloğlu 2004; 
Alemdar 2004). The authoritarian tone of the single party regime during 
this period (1923–1946) required press owners to act line with the republi-
can discourse and aid the dissemination of the values of the new regime to 
the masses. This was followed by the ‘transitory phase’ (1947–1980), which 
can be further evaluated in two different periods due to the military inter-
vention in 1960. The multi-party system began in 1946 in Turkey and the 
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elections in 1950 brought the Democrat Party to power. The 1950s also cor-
respond to the modernization of journalism in Turkey, in the sense that 
modern newspaper publishing technologies were introduced (Adaklı 
2006). However, this period also carried with it the old habits of repression 
of the press and the media censorship imposed by the Democrat Party gov-
ernments until the military intervention in 1960. For a brief period in the 
1960s legal safeguards were established to protect journalists from persecu-
tion by those in political power. The political transition that took place in 
Turkey at this time corresponds to what Hafez identifies as ‘characterized 
by either reformist or revolutionary processes away from authoritarian 
regimes’ (Hafez 2005: 147).
According to Hafez, in the third phase of the democratization of the 
press in developing countries, consolidation takes place. As he suggests, 
consolidation includes ‘the establishment of institutions like a constitu-
tion, parliament, [and] democratic media as well as a stable political cul-
ture and vibrant civil society. Consolidation is prone to relapse because the 
authoritarian bureaucracy and societal values cannot be replaced from one 
day to another’ (Hafez 2005: 147). We argue that the consolidation phase in 
Turkey corresponds to the period following the 1980 military intervention. 
During the 1980s, with the introduction of neoliberalism led by the Özal 
governments (see Önis 2004), the nature of journalism in Turkey became 
more sensationalist. Profit rather than journalistic ideals motivated news-
papers as they changed hands. This process accelerated in the 1990s in the 
context of an economic transformation in media through convergence and 
concentration when big business groups acquired newspapers and TV sta-
tions to create media empires (Kaya 1994; Tuncel 1994; Sönmez 1996; Adaklı 
2009; Sönmez 2010). Media alliances with the political elite during the 1990s 
strengthened the economic power of the media, but also resulted in the 
establishment of various types of editorial censorship mechanisms and in 
the erosion of unions. Journalists were essentially stripped of their critical 
stance toward the government by media conglomerates that were protect-
ing their economic interests (Finkel 2000; Tılıc 2000; Tunç, 2003).
From 1999 when Turkey’s EU membership candidacy was accepted until 
the launch of accession talks in 2005, Turkey leaped forward in democratiz-
ing its legislative framework for the media. However, this Europeanization 
of policy-making did not result in a paradigmatic change or transformation 
in the recognition of media freedoms but was rather limited to legislative 
adaptation (Sümer 2010). Nevertheless, even this legislative adaptation 
meant something for the supporters of the EU and when the AKP came to 
power in 2002, its government promised to pursue this democratization 
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agenda and carry the country to its future in Europe. Thus, the AKP govern-
ment’s current negative approach to the media is very much in contradic-
tion with its earlier promises. Following Hafez (2005), we can argue that 
Turkey had undergone the two stages mentioned above, inching away from 
the authoritarian model toward a more liberal and consolidated model 
until there appeared a fundamental debate between the press and the AKP 
government in Turkey. This last phase is proving to be difficult for both 
media conglomerates in Turkey and the ruling AKP government.
What we witness in Turkey today is the liberal right-wing media strug-
gling to survive against the AKP-supported green media, some of which 
have recently been acquired by the new big business groups that originally 
represented small to medium-scale businesses in Anatolia in the 1990s and 
gradually expanded their businesses after the AKP came to power in 2002.1 
This government sponsored transformation works in an autocratic manner, 
silencing media that are critical of the government. As the political rhetoric 
of the AKP government insists on calling the current administration ‘the 
most liberal government of Turkey to date’, the qualities of the media autoc-
racy that the AKP administration has created resemble and can be com-
pared to previous autocratic periods in Turkish political history. Yet never 
in the history of the media in Turkey were the redistribution of media 
power and the silencing of journalistic expression this paramount to politi-
cal debate.
The AKP Government and Media
The formation of the AKP has its roots in the Islamic political movement 
created by Necmettin Erbakan in the late 1960s.2 Erbakan and the three 
political parties established were banned from politics after the military 
coups of 1971, 1980 and 1997. Only after the 1995 general elections did 
Erbakan and his followers have a chance to lead a government in a coali-
tion. There was a younger generation of Islamists within Erbakan’s party 
who were seen as moderate, pro-western, and in support of globalization 
and capitalism. This group, which later formed the original cadres of the 
AKP, became more visible after the so-called ‘postmodern coup’ that took 
1 For a further discussion on what ‘green capital’ indicates in the Turkish context, see 
Demir et al. 2004; Rubin 2005.
2 For understanding the rise of political Islam in Turkey, see Gülalp 1999; Gülalp 2003; 
Yavuz 1997.
 M. Akser and B. Baybars-Hawks /   
306 Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication 5 (2012) 302–321 
place on 28 February 1997. On this date, the coalition government formed 
by the liberal right party DYP (Doğru Yol Partisi/True Path Party) and 
Islamic right party RP (Refah Partisi/Welfare Party) were given an ultima-
tum by the military. Then Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan and his dep-
uty Tansu Çiller were forced by the army to sign an edict, the purpose of 
which was to destroy the influence of Islamic political power. Shortly after 
the declaration of the edict, the government changed hands, Islamic high 
schools were closed, prominent members of the RP were arrested on dis-
puted charges and eventually the RP was closed by the constitutional court 
and accused of trying to undermine the secular foundations of the repub-
lic. The mainstream media and their owners supported this soft coup and 
later it became common knowledge that the military were closely watching 
and sometimes interfering with print, broadcast and online media in the 
name of protecting the secular republic.3
The AKP was formed in 2001 in the midst of political strife that resulted 
in the closure of the FP (Fazilet Partisi/ Virtue Party) by the constitutional 
court. Its coming to power after the elections in November 2002 was a direct 
result of the organization and hard work of all the party members across 
the country, but there were other reasons behind the unprecedented public 
support it received, reasons that carried the party to power in three con-
secutive elections.4 Between 1991 and 2002 several coalition governments 
were accused of nepotism and corruption. Two consecutive economic cri-
ses in 2000 and 2001 had a crushing impact on most of the population.5 The 
mismanagement of the banking sector was influential in the emergence of 
both crises. The measures taken to regulate the banking sector also had an 
impact on the restructuring of the media sector, since some of these banks 
were owned by business groups also operating in the media. These groups’ 
media assets were overtaken by the newly established Savings Deposit 
Insurance Fund (Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu, TMSF) and later acquired 
either by barons that already controlled a large portion of media or by new 
business groups entering the media sector. The AKP promoted its close 
business circles to benefit from this wave of restructuring and own media 
outlets on sale from 2005 onward.
3 For more on the 28 February process and its repercussions on politics in Turkey, see 
Cizre and Çınar 2003.
4 There is a huge literature on the rise of the AKP to power and what this means for 
Turkish political history. For a selection, see Tepe 2005; Cinar 2006; Özbudun 2006; Önis 
2006; Cizre 2008.
5 For more on these two consecutive crises, see Önis and Rubin 2004.
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The first AKP period (2002–2007) saw the implementation of a solid eco-
nomic program, the passing of reform packages in parliament to enter the 
EU, extensive privatization of state-owned economic enterprises and a 
proposed solution to the Cyprus problem.6 During this period the AKP gov-
ernment’s policies were that of compliance with the media. The AKP 
government desperately tried to prove its conservative yet secular stance 
toward the military, the judiciary and intelligentsia in the mainstream 
media. The turning point for many came after several court cases related to 
the veiling ban were ruled upon—against the wishes of the AKP’s voter 
base who wanted to study at universities and work in public offices with the 
Islamic headscarf. The second major controversy took place during the 
2007 presidential election that resulted in the election of the former foreign 
minister of the government, Abdullah Gül, whose wife was wearing an 
Islamic headscarf. This crisis created the fear of another military coup and 
the media fueled this fear for the AKP establishment. The dust settled after 
the general elections that took place just a couple of months after the presi-
dential election and the AKP had won a second time majority in parlia-
ment, declaring that the so-called apprenticeship phase was over and they 
were to enter the journeyman phase in politics. Prime Minister Erdoğan’s 
election platform was a divisive one tending toward an ‘us versus them’ 
election pitch, warning all segments of society of a wrong choice and its 
possible aftermath. Media that are critical of Erdoğan and the AKP policies 
were also warned to behave. After the election, in his famous balcony 
speech, Prime Minister Erdoğan promised that all will be treated equal and 
the media need not fear. The facts proved otherwise (Güvenç 2007).
The AKP government’s actions to reshape the media can be seen in the 
changes of media ownership patterns between 2002 and 2008 (Adaklı 
2009). The media assets of two powerful groups, Ciner and Uzan, changed 
hands to more government friendly owners. Among these two, the rise and 
fall of the Uzan Group is remarkable in the sense that it perfectly reveals 
how the media scene has changed in Turkey in the last two decades. The 
Uzan family was known for its lavish lifestyle and together with very power-
ful media outlets they also owned the second largest GSM Company 
(TELSIM) in Turkey that was in business with the cell phone manufacturer 
Motorola. The family group benefited greatly from the privatization ten-
ders in the 1990s. Most of the Uzan family were already being investigated 
6 For more on the toots and changes of the AKP’s political rhetoric, see Doğan 2005; 
Keyman 2010.
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by the previous governments for the mismanagement of their banks and 
not paying Motorola its share of billions of dollars of cellphones sold. Cem 
Uzan entered two consecutive elections is 2002 and 2007 and his party 
attracted an unprecedented voter turnout (around 7 percent of all of the 
popular vote).7 Uzan was critical of the AKP in the 2007 elections and tar-
geted the prime minister in every public speech he made. Lawsuits fol-
lowed after the election and Uzan family members fled the country and 
their companies were sized by the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF). 
The media assets of the Uzan Group were sold to either international cor-
porations, such as the Canadian company, CanWest, or to groups friendly to 
the government. The Uzan Group lost Star TV, Star Newspaper, Metro FM, 
Rock FM and Joy FM along with its national GSM operator license (Adaklı 
2010: 591–595). The Doğan Group, which was on good terms with the AKP at 
that time, acquired Star TV and became the most powerful media conglom-
erate. We argue that the conglomerate pressure in the AKP media autoc-
racy timeline began in 2007 with the ways in which the ‘Uzan issue’ was 
handled and later directed to the most powerful media conglomerate in 
Turkey: Aydın Doğan. This controversy is further assessed in the following 
section.
The year 2008 marks the beginning of waves of arrests of journalists in 
the Ergenekon investigation, which targeted some journalists, along with 
military and civilian bureaucracy who were allegedly involved in illegal 
activities to overthrow the government (Rainsford 2008; BBC 2012). The 
arrests showed that the evidence was gathered through phone-tapping and 
Internet surveillance. The new technologies of surveillance that were 
revealed ranged from tapping into homes and offices through inactive cell 
phones to using laser technology to gather sound from inside the buildings. 
The arrests that started in 2008 continued in wave after wave. Police surveil-
lance became so widespread that Prime Minister Erdoğan declared that 
even his phone was tapped (Hürriyet Daily News 2011d).
Next came Internet blackouts and bans in 2009. The opposition party 
and the NGOs opposed to the AKP widely used YouTube videos of AKP 
leaders to condemn their anti-secular discourse during the 2007 election 
campaigns. Fearing persecution through videos and facing another prose-
cution to close down the AKP at the constitutional court, the govern-
ment used Information Technologies and Communication Authority (BTK) 
7 For more on the impact of Uzan family and Cem Uzan’s political quest, see Bora 2002, 
Akın 2010.
 M. Akser and B. Baybars-Hawks /   
 Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication 5 (2012) 302–321 309
to regulate and block any website they found disturbing (Hürriyet 2007). 
The YouTube ban was not lifted until the AKP supported president-elect, 
Abdullah Gül, personally interfered in 2010. The year 2010 was important 
for the AKP as the government proposed many changes to the constitution. 
The main changes were made to the articles that allowed the control of the 
appointments of judges and prosecutors to higher courts. The constitu-
tional referendum that took place on 12 September 2010 resulted in an AKP 
favored result.
After this major win in the 2010 constitutional referendum, Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan convened a large gathering of all media rep-
resentatives and to their shock declared a set of principles under which the 
media should operate in reporting news (Judson 2010). This approach 
sharply contrasted with his previous announcement, made after the gen-
eral election in 2007, in which he indicated his empathy and understanding 
for those who did not vote for him and stated that he would be open to criti-
cism of all kinds from all parties (Today’s Zaman 2007). However, as of 2012, 
more than a hundred journalists have been arrested and are awaiting trial 
for allegedly trying to overthrow the government through violent means. 
These charges are based on phone tapping, unidentified witness accounts 
and some journal entries by military officials. Under these circumstances, it 
is no surprise that since 2007 there has been a consistent drop in Turkey’s 
place in global human rights watch lists concerning freedom of the press. 
Freedom House Report on the Internet states that user rights are violated, 
users are blocked from reading and writing content and that there is ‘sub-
stantial political censorship’ (Freedom House 2011). Thomas Hammarberg, 
the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, also criti-
cized Turkey on the very poor conditions regarding the freedom of press, 
indicating the increase in criminal proceedings and arrests involving jour-
nalists (Hammarberg 2011). The negative government practices toward 
news media of all forms point toward an increasingly strong neoliberal 
media autocracy in Turkey. Print and broadcast media reporters continu-
ally feel pressured toward self-censorship. Increasing number of veteran 
journalists such as Emin Çölaşan and Haluk Şahin either resigned or were 
dismissed from their positions due to pressures from the government (see 
Çölaşan 2007; Şahin 2011). The pressure used by the government to suppress 
the media can be compared to those of the neoliberal conservative govern-
ments of Berlusconi and Putin. Pressure on media bosses, the arrests of 
journalists, Internet bans, surveillance and taping (as well as defamation on 
YouTube) and accreditation blocking are also reported both in Italy and 
Russia.
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Conglomerate Pressure
The first problem we identified in relation to freedom of expression in the 
Turkish media is conglomerate pressure. The AKP government gives the 
impression of an administration that does not tolerate non-compliance 
with its policies and it requires the media to actively support the govern-
ment. The government has legal tools that can be used indirectly through 
seemingly autonomous institutions such as the Savings Deposit Insurance 
Fund (TMSF), which was given legal authority to appropriate and resell the 
property and liquidity of businesses due to bankruptcy or criminal sentenc-
ing of the owner. The TMSF has been criticized for intervening in (i.e., polit-
ically manipulating) large business groups, as happened during the sales of 
the Uzan Group’s media assets (see Aykol 2008). However, when they were 
unable to totally control large industry-owned media through legislative 
measures, the AKP government started using economic and political- 
discursive tools. The most significant tool is conglomerate pressure, which 
takes the form of government imposed fines over taxes, previously over-
looked by the government agencies. Although some of the economic mea-
sures taken against media conglomerates are entirely legal, it is problematic 
that they were imposed and enforced once these media companies became 
critical of the government. Political-discursive tools include government 
agenda setting, calling for boycotts of the press and ‘sided’ (biased) media 
arguments.
The AKP governments did not mind having conglomerates such as 
the Doğan Group (DYH) that praised its activities such as economic devel-
opment and political stability. The two other large cross-media groups 
were Çukurova and Çalık; the latter is known for being close to the AKP 
cadres. Aydın Doğan, the owner of DYH, was a mid-level businessman until 
the late 1970s and the creation of his empire began with his acquisition of 
the two important newspapers in Turkey: Milliyet in 1979 and Hürriyet in 
1983. As of 2009, Doğan Media controlled more than 50 percent of all the 
print, audio-visual and new media in Turkey. Doğan is the owner of 
the daily newspapers Hürriyet and Radikal, and TV channels Kanal D and 
CNN Turk.
The controversy between Aydın Doğan and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that 
took place in 2008 is a very significant case that reveals how economic and 
political-discursive tools are simultaneously used by the government. 
It began with the coverage of a court case taking place in Germany on 
the misuse of donations to Deniz Feneri (Lighthouse Foundation), an 
NGO in Germany. Aydın Doğan’s newspapers started questioning the AKP 
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governement’s involvement in the fraud and whether the donations 
were used to fund the AKP’s activities. Against these allegations, Prime 
Minister Erdoğan blamed Aydın Doğan for igniting this controversy, in 
retaliation for failing to acquire a government tender. The Doğan media 
group then claimed that they were under attack by the government for 
revealing the truth and his media outlets’ news reporting were repressed 
through economic and political pressure (see Hürriyet 2008b). The govern-
ment ministers and Prime Minister Erdoğan accused the Doğan Media 
Group of fraud and false news reporting, relying on the biased media 
line, and even made an open call to the supporters of his party to boycott 
Doğan Media newspapers; he claimed that these newspapers have a low 
number of readers anyway (Haber 24 2008). The government also used 
other discursive tools to control the media, the most common being 
the portrayal of Doğan Media and other similar groups as rich, snobbish, 
high class and bourgeoisie. The group’s response to these tools has been 
to change its stance from gatekeeping to priming; that is, presenting a 
flood of negative portrayals of the government through all its media 
channels.
Our research from the onset was initiated by Aydın Doğan’s defiant tele-
vision call to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who denounced Aydın 
Doğan as biased, because Doğan’s newspapers and television stations 
were increasingly critical of government policies. Aydın Doğan had fired 
prominent columnists and closed a critical newspaper (Gözcü) from his 
group to ease tensions with the government. This move failed to take the 
pressure off and he took a defiant position on television. The prime minis-
ter responded to these calls on television as well. The debate lasted for a few 
days on television and was then forgotten. Then Aydın Doğan was sued for 
billions of dollars in back tax payments. He tried to extricate himself from 
businesses that had dealings with the government, such as Turkish Oil 
Company. Ultimately, he could not even sell his media empire, as the gov-
ernment tax agency found irregularities in sales transfer payments from a 
German media company. Aydın Doğan resigned as CEO of his company, his 
chief journalist, Ertuğrul Özkök, left his post at the flagship newspaper 
Hürriyet. Currently, Doğan media has been cleared of all charges and Aydın 
Doğan has won in court cases relating to unpaid taxes. It is important to 
note that it is the exception, rather than the rule for a Turkish media mogul 
to take on the government for unfair treatment. Yet it has become quite 
common for a prime minister to attack the news media to gain popular sup-
port discursively by dubbing them ‘richmen’s pawns’. Once again, the media 
withdrew and made concessions to survive.
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Today, the Turkish government proactively sets the agenda by comment-
ing on the liberal media. Unfortunately the scholarly writing on the issue 
of pressure on the media have counterparts in Vladimir Putin’s Russia 
(Ognyanova 2009; Kiriya 2011) and Berlusconi’s Italy (Ragnedda and 
Muschert 2011). Worse still, the censorship-related literature in the field 
only comes from Tonga, China and other non-democratic countries 
(Stockmann and Gallagher 2011, Vikilani 2010).
Judicial Suppression
Another problematic area is judicial suppression of journalists who are 
prosecuted for various statements they have made in print, Internet blogs 
and even phone conversations that were monitored (see Temelkuran 2012). 
Many people in Turkey believe that the arrests function to silence critics of 
AKP government and intimidate any potential critics (Temelkuran 2012). 
The waves of arrests that began in 2008 included prominent nationalist 
reporters Soner Yalçın (ODATV), Nedim Şener (Milliyet), Ergün Poyraz, Erol 
Manisalı (Cumhuriyet), Tuncay Özkan (Kanaltürk), and Mustafa Balbay 
(Cumhuriyet). The last two of these journalists were elected members of 
parliament in absentia in the 2011 general elections, but have not been 
released from prison; this adds yet another level of political and judicial 
complexity to an already contested issue. Another method of intimidation 
takes the form of police raids near dawn and searches of journalist’s homes 
that result—at least at times—in no evidence on any criminal activity. One 
such notorious case included the arrest of a journalist, Ahmet Şık, because 
he had written (but not yet published) a book on the Islamization of 
bureaucracy (see Gottschlich 2011). Protests arose from many NGOs, who 
stated that the idea of a book that has not been made public in published 
form cannot be subject to criminal investigation because such action is 
unconstitutional and can be considered ‘thought crime’ (Reporters Without 
Borders 2011). The PDF version of the book became an instant hit and many 
journalists challenged the police to also arrest them on charges of having 
read the unpublished book. The book was eventually published with the 
satirical title: The Forbidden Book: Dare to Touch, It Burns You. In the case of 
the Ergenekon trials, dissenting journalists were arrested based on anony-
mous tips and some telephone conversations (see Hürriyet Daily News 
2011a). They have been held pending trial since 2007 and have not been 
found guilty. While journalists cannot report or write critical reports against 
the government, the Islamic green media continually publishes reports of 
 M. Akser and B. Baybars-Hawks /   
 Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication 5 (2012) 302–321 313
those arrested, labeling their colleagues ‘criminal’. The number of journal-
ists awaiting trial in prison had reached 94 as of March 2012 (Filkins 2012).
Online Banishment
The third area of analysis is the regulation of the Internet. Government 
regulatory bodies such as the Turkish Information and Communication 
Technology Authority applied bans on sites based on unfavorable com-
ments about the government (Freedom House 2011). The blanket ruling of 
these agencies led to the banning of YouTube. YouTube could not be 
accessed by Turkish users until recently (Reuters 2010). The YouTube ban 
came into effect after the release of several videos related to anti-secular 
speeches made by several prominent AKP figures, including Prime Minister 
Tayyip Erdoğan and President Abdullah Gül. The ban was lifted several 
times by different courts but enacted by other district courts. People found 
ways of bypassing the ban using proxy sites and the prime minister even 
declared that he could access YouTube. The ban was lifted close to the gen-
eral elections of June 2011. Yet the government silently introduced a blanket 
filter in August 2011 that affected every Internet user in Turkey (Today’s 
Zaman 2011a). The aim of the government, as it was argued, was to protect 
young children from sex, drugs, and violence on the Internet. The protest-
ers interpreted the move as anti-democratic, because it would operate as 
a blanket ban covering everyone without their consent. Due to protests 
on the ban, the government took a step back and made filtering voluntary. 
Today there are thousands of sites that can be seen from the rest of the 
world but not from Turkey, because government agencies block them 
(Hürriyet Daily News 2011c).
Another example of online intimidation is the case of Ekşi Sözlük (The 
sour times), a satirical website where users mock people and events by add-
ing entries. The site was blocked by court order for mocking Islamic figures 
close to the AKP government (Today’s Zaman 2011c). The entries were 
removed and the site was allowed to operate shortly after. Another scandal 
arose when the anonymous users of the site suddenly discovered that they 
are being sued by various people they mocked (Eğrikavuk 2011); it seems 
that the government required the managers of the website to reveal the 
true identities of individuals who had trusted the use of aliases and freely 
criticized the government (Jones 2011; Karaca 2011; Kelly 2011). The loss of 
anonymity and fear of persecution is undermining Internet freedom in 
Turkey today.
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Surveillance Defamation
Given many examples of private video and audio recordings in the hands of 
political rivals it can be argued that there is increased circulation of private 
information in the hands of the police, prosecutors, and also journalists 
who support government policies. Access to private information at this 
level suggests the existence of a big brother like surveillance group within 
the police that serves the interests of the government by spying on poten-
tial critics of the government. Suspected but unproven, this group seems to 
be able to provide defamatory surveillance videos of prominent figures, 
military and civilian bureaucracy, and members of parliament, especially 
those in opposition, to use them for leverage and to create a sense of guilt 
by association (Kayakiran 2009). The complacent attitude of the govern-
ment in not blocking these videos on the Internet is in fact a passive way of 
aiding surveillance defamation. During the summer of 2011, general elec-
tions tapes popped up on the Internet featuring footage of sexual relations 
by opposition members of parliament. Just days before the general elec-
tions six prominent members of MHP resigned after the release of surveil-
lance videos of their private lives (Hürriyet 2011a). It was common to use 
terms that include moral tones such as ‘adulterer caught in love nest’ by the 
government-friendly media (Fraser 2011; Strauss 2011). Even the then leader 
of the main opposition party CHP resigned due to such defamatory tape 
recordings released on YouTube. The opposition parties called for a ban on 
the videos, yet the government did not respond (Jenkins 2011). Even judges 
and prosecutors made the news as they installed jammers in their offices to 
prevent possible surveillance (Hürriyet 2009).
Accreditation Discrimination
Finally the new accreditation regime came into place. Certain journalists 
and news reporters are excluded from reporting the news from government 
authorities. The ‘safe’ press list released by prime minister’s press bureau 
includes journalists deemed safe and friendly; they are given direct access 
to the prime minister and government officials. The creation of the accredi-
tation regime reflects the biased-media discourse of Prime Minister Tayyip 
Erdoğan. In Erdoğan’s view, there is friendly media and there is sided media. 
Erdoğan also used the biased media argument during his election cam-
paign in 2007. In November 2008 several journalists from all parts of the 
political spectrum (but not siding with the AKP) were denied access to 
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report on the government. This ban attracted international criticism as the 
WAN (World Association of Newspapers) and ENPA (European Newspaper 
Publishers Association) wrote an open letter to Tayyip Erdoğan requesting 
the lifting of the ban (Hürriyet 2008c). Hence we argue that by attempting 
to control who can report on it, the AKP government has created another 
tool for controlling the media.
The practice of gathering media barons and dictating to them what not 
to report has been a common practice by AKP officials. After a third major-
ity win in 2011, it is known to the general public that Erdoğan has dropped 
all lawsuits against journalists who criticized him during the election 
(Today’s Zaman 2012). Yet periodic meetings are held by the prime minister 
and his deputies with media barons about what to publish or broadcast 
(Hürriyet 2011b). The exclusion of news editors from the meetings indicates 
that the AKP government views the news media as a politically engaged 
economic enterprise rather than a public service that functions to check 
and balance political authority in a liberal democracy.
Conclusion
In this article we have identified measures used by the AKP government to 
control critical media. As we suggested, the media autocracy in Turkey 
today can be categorized under five headings: conglomerate pressure, judi-
cial suppression, online banishment, surveillance defamation and accredi-
tation discrimination.
Conglomerate pressure is exercised as an autocratic tool to control 
media barons. It includes scare tactics, such as prosecution for unpaid back 
taxes and the imposition of fines on media conglomerates that may result 
in financial disaster for media moguls, as in the Aydın Doğan case in 2008. 
Media barons may have to replace newspaper management or tone down 
their critical tone to stay in business.
Judicial suppression is a way creating fear that government officials and 
MPs will continually bring lawsuits against journalists for criticizing the 
government. This includes special prosecutors arresting journalists without 
producing evidence and the creation of sided/biased media discourse by 
the prime minister. The Ergenekon trials and the journalists—arrested and 
still awaiting trail for alleged terrorist ties—have the common denomina-
tor of being critical and anti-globalization in their stance.
Online banishment is used to block websites that have damaging evi-
dence or critical material against the government. The blocked sites include 
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YouTube and other popular sites such as Ekşi Sözlük. The registered and 
anonymous users of such sites are found, sued and fined. Online banish-
ment includes the closing down of websites that criticize the government, 
the creation of exclusion lists by the Telecommunications Authority so that 
users cannot access certain sites, the creation of a filtering system based on 
moral codes (blanket control), the YouTube ban, the loss of anonymity of 
users (Ekşi Sözlük) and regulatory decisions based on moral codes. The gov-
ernment backs down from the bans from time to time to avoid user- 
protests, yet the wide range of blocked content increases daily.
Surveillance defamation involves arrests based on phone tapping, 
Internet surveillance of journalists and dissenters, general voice surveil-
lance and special mobile surveillance vehicles employed to follow dissent-
ers. The unknown groups distribute damaging videos of the AKP’s political 
opponents. The complicity of the AKP government is evident in their 
refusal to block or ban such videos, making this, in effect, a passive tactic to 
shut down criticism. The change in the opposition party CHP’s and MHP’s 
leadership during 2011 came as a result of the spread of such videos on 
YouTube.
Accreditation discrimination is a direct outcome of the new accredita-
tion regime, in which journalists critical of the government are forbidden 
access to government information and interviews with ruling politicians. 
This move in 2008 was criticized widely at home and abroad, yet is still in 
practice today.
The media in Turkey has long been under economic and political 
restraints. Journalists have shown reactionary and sometimes partisan atti-
tudes toward governments. Yet until recently there was a glimmer of hope 
of practicing the informative and critical function of journalism. In con-
temporary Turkey, even the basic operation of journalism cannot be prop-
erly performed due to fear, intimidation, bans, imprisonments, blocked 
access to information and defamatory surveillance. The media autocracy of 
today can only usher in a second-rate and a lesser democracy in Turkey.
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